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A NEW ETHIC OF DISCLOSURE-NATIONAL STUDENT
MARKETING AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
I. Introduction
On February 3, 1972, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a
complaint against National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC); Peat,
Marwick & Mitchell (PMM), its auditors; White & Case, a major New York
law firm; and Lord, Bissell & Brook, a major Chicago law firm,1 charging them,
among others,2 with multiple violations of the Securities and Exchange Acts.
According to the SEC's complaint, NSMC solicited proxies from its shareholders
which were needed to approve a merger with Interstate National Corporation.'
The shareholders accordingly approved the merger, subject to certain conditions.
First, PMM was to issue a comfort letter stating that it had no reason to believe
that the uncertified nine-month financial statements contained in the solicita-
tion materials were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles, and that the company had suffered no adverse changes since the
previous year-end certified statements were issued. Second, White & Case was to
issue an opinion letter stating that all steps required to consummate the merger
had been validly taken and that NSMC had not, to the knowledge of counsel,
violated any federal or state statute or regulation with respect to the proposed
merger. A similar opinion letter from Lord, Bissell & Brook was required by the
stockholders of Interstate National Corporation. The comfort letter issued by
PMM allegedly disclosed that, in order to present fairly the results of operations
and the financial condition of the company, material adjustments to the nine-
month unaudited financial statements were needed. PMM therefore recom-
mended resolicitation of the shareholders before consummation of the merger.
The letter was allegedly dictated in part to one of the officers of NSMC and a
partner of White & Case during the closing meeting; the remainder was dictated
to a partner of White & Case shortly after the meeting. The recommendations
contained in the comfort letter were revealed neither to the representatives of
Interstate National Corporation at the meeting nor to the shareholders of either
company. The SEC alleges that, after learning of the letter, both law firms issued
opinion letters stating that all steps necessary to consummate the merger had been
validly taken and that to the knowledge of counsel no federal or state statute or
regulation had been violated.
1 S.E.C. v. Nat'i Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc.
L. R. 93,360 (1972).
2 The officers of NSMC and individual partners in the law and accounting firms as well
as a sole practitioner were also charged with violations.
3 There are four claims in the SEC's complaint. Only the issues raised by the second
claim will be discussed in this article. The first claim does not charge the law firms with any
violations. The third claim alleges violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and rule
10b-5 by White & Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook for issuing an opinion stating that certain
shares acquired in the merger could be sold, and by officers and directors of Interstate for
selling the shares without revealing the contents of the comfort letter issued by PMM. The
fourth claim alleges similar violations involving a different merger.
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The SEC contends that these transactions violated: (1) section 17 (a) of the
Securities Act of 1933,' which makes it unlawful for any person to use any means
of interstate transportation or communications in the sale or offer of securities to
commit fraud; (2) rule 1Ob-5,5 which uses language similar to section 17(a) but
is broader in scope in including the use of any facility of the national securities
exchange; (3) section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
requires filing of any reports prescribed by rules or regulations; and (4) section
14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' which makes it unlawful to use any
means of interstate commerce or facility of the national securities exchange to
solicit or permit one's name to be used to solicit any proxy in contravention of any
prescribed rules or regulations. Injunctive relief is sought against all defendants.
According to the SEC, the proper course of action for the attorneys, once they
became aware of the possible violation, would have been to refuse to issue their
opinion letters and to insist upon revision of the nine-month financial statements
and resolicitation of the shareholders. If the officers of NSMC refused to re-
solicit the shareholders, the SEC maintains that the attorneys should have with-
drawn from the case and notified the Commission of the misleading nature of the
financial statements.
A permanent injunction by consent order has been entered against NSMC.
By consenting to the injunction, several other defendants have also been restrained
from further similar violations and have been barred from asserting any privileges
they might have had to withhold information in any related litigation., The
attorneys and the accountants did not consent to the injunction because under
Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice9 the entry of such an injunction could
result, without any hearing, in their being suspended from future appearances or
practice before the commission.
There are important issues of both law and fact in this case. For the pur-
poses of this note, all the facts as alleged by the SEC are assumed to be true.
The principle legal issue is whether an attorney, notwithstanding the attorney-
client privilege, ever has a duty to the public or the SEC to disclose facts learned
during his professional employment by a publicly held corporation. The resolu-
tion of this issue is critical since it arises while attorneys are playing roles of in-
creased importance in corporate mergers and similar transactions.
Historically the attorney has acted as either an advocate or as an advisor.'
In each of these roles the attorney is responsible almost exclusively to his client.
While these responsibilities are adequately defined, problems often have arisen
when third parties have been directly affected by the attorney's work.
4 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a).
7 Id. § 78n(a).
8 SEC v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., No. 225 Civ. 72 (D.D.C., filed July 26, 1972);
CCH FED. SEC. L. R. 93,581 (1972).
9 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972).
10 In asserting a position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals
with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer
serving as advisor primarily assists his client in determining the course of future
conduct and relationships.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSioNAL REsPoNSIBILITY CANON 7, EC 7-3 '(1970).
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Courts have on occasion recognized that in certain circumstances an at-
torney may have duties running to third parties. In Heyer v. Flaig," for example,
an attorney was charged with negligence in failing to inform his client at the time
he drafted a will of the effects of a post-testamentary marriage. Although the
attorney had no previous contact with the intended beneficiaries of the will, the
court sustained their complaint on the grounds that "public policy requires that
the attorney exercise his position of trust and superior knowledge responsibly so as
not to affect adversely persons whose rights and interests are certain and fore-
seeable.""2 It has been suggested that similar liability to third parties be imposed
in the area of securities law.'
3
II. The Accountant's Responsibilities
In some respects, the attorney's opinion on the legality of a transaction is
similar to the C.P.A.'s opinion on the conformity of financial statements to
generally accepted accounting principles. The responsibilities of a certified
public accountant as an objective observer have been clarified by recent judicial
opinions and by pronouncements of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
A certified public accountant may act either as a dependent or an inde-
pendent accountant. 4 A dependent accountant's duties include undertaking
special studies, providing management services, preparing interim financial state-
ments without audit, and other similar functions. An independent accountant's
role involves auditing a client's financial statements in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards in order to render an opinion stating that the
financial statements are in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples applied on a basis consistent with the preceding year.
An independent accountant has a continuing duty to disclose information
which he acquires after issuing an opinion on a financial statement when such
information leads him to believe the statement was misleading. This duty arises
because the accounting firm's opinion is relied upon by investors. 5
A detailed list of the independent accountant's responsibilities is contained
in the Statements on Auditing Procedure published by the Committee on Auditing
11 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
12 Id. at 229, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
13 Address by Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., New York Law Journal seminar on "Expand-
ing Responsibilities under the Securities Acts," June 5-6, 1972. Professor Hazard noted other
areas which he said give rise to similar responsibilities: bond counsel in issuing bond opinions;
an attorney making a report or evaluation of title to real property in connection with an acquisi-
tion of any sort; and an attorney's acts in connection with closures of decedent's or in-
competent's estates. For a summary of the address see SEcuariEs REGULATION & LAW REPORT
No. 156, at A-1 (1972).
14 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1972), contains the accounting rules of the
SEC, which apply, inter alia, to registration statements filed pursuant to the Securities and
Exchange Acts. The rules were recently amended in 37 Fed. Reg. 14,591 (1972), and new
guidelines regarding independence were issued. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,295 (1972). The new rules
will take effect for statements for periods ending on or after December 31, 1972. Both the old
and the new rules provide that the Commission will not recognize any person as a certified
public accountant who is not in fact independent. Id. § 210.2-01. The examples contained
under the old rules have been modified and expanded under the new rules.
15 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Procedure of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. It is recog-
nized within the profession that these general rules of auditing procedure may be
subject to exception but departures from the committee's recommendations must
be justified by those who do not comply. For example, the accountant is expected,
upon learning of possible material errors in statements he certified, to discuss the
problem with appropriate levels of management, including the board of direc-
tors." If the client then fails to make appropriate disclosures to those known to
be relying on the erroneous financial statements, the accountant must then give:
a. Notification to the client that the auditor's report must no longer be
associated with the financial statements.
b. Notification to regulatory agencies having jurisdiction over the client that
the auditor's report should no longer be relied upon.
c. Notification to each person known to the auditor to be relying on the
financial statements, that his report should no longer be relied upon....
[But when the client is a publicly held corporation] notification to a
regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the client will usually be the
only practicable way for the auditor to provide appropriate disclosure.' 7
A dependent accountant is not required to make disclosures when he dis-
covers that unaudited statements do not make a fair presentation of the results of
operations or the financial condition of a company.'8 The Committee on Audit-
ing Procedure has prescribed the accountant's responsibilities regarding state-
ments prepared without audit as an accounting service to the company. The
accountant need only represent that the statements have not been examined by
him and that he expresses no opinion on them. 9
III. The Attorney's Responsibilities
In NSMC the SEC is seeking judicial recognition of an attorney's disclosure
responsibilities in a securities law context. Although the SEC has not yet provided
a comprehensive statement of the attorney's disclosure duties, the standards ap-
plied in the case of an accountant may provide guidelines.
When a corporate client's shareholders require him to render an opinion
regarding the legality of a proposed transaction the attorney's role resembles that
of an accountant. Shareholders rely upon the attorney to protect the corporation's
interests and their interests alike. Normally the attorney is expected to advise and
work closely with management in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative,
or other person connected with the entity."20 Thus, if the interests of manage-
16 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
PROCEDURE No. 41(5) (1969) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT].
17 STATEMENT NO. 41(9) (1967).
18 The court recognized this in Fisher v. Kletz, saying: "In sum.., there is absolutely no
basis in law for imposing upon .. . [an accounting firm] a duty to disclose its knowledge of
the falsity of the interim [unaudited] financial statements." 266 F. Supp. 180, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
19 STATEMENT No. 38(4)(1967).
20 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 5, EC 5-18 (1970).
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ment conflict with the interests of the corporation, the attorney would be obliged
to act in the best interests of the corporation.
In NSMC the attorneys allegedly discovered that proxies were obtained
from the shareholders on the basis of misleading financial statements. Since the
attorneys normally dealt with management, they first should have notified man-
agement that resolicitation would be necessary in order to obtain the requisite
shareholder approval for the consummation of the merger. If this advice were
given and were followed, there would have been no conflict between the interests
of the corporation and the interests of management; however, if management
refused to follow this advice, it would have been acting contrary to the interests
of the corporations by perpetrating a fraud on the shareholders. Since the at-
torneys' primary responsibility is to the corporation, they would be obligated to
take some action to prevent the fraud.
A fundamental issue in NSMC concerns the duty of an attorney to disclose
to the SEC any knowledge he might have of an impending violation in order to
prevent that violation. The SEC contends that disclosure is required by the
Securities and Exchange Acts. A serious counterargument is that such infor-
mation is within the attorney-client privilege which precludes an attorney from
making disclosure.
Since the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Acts, aider and abettor
liability has increasingly been imposed for failure to disclose fraudulent activity.
In SEC u. National Bankers Life Insurance Co.,21 the court noted that, with
respect to fraudulent conduct in violation of section 17 (a) of the Securities Act "
and rule 10b-5,2" "aiding and abetting" is an elusive concept. 4 The court stated
that "[i]t is clear the defendant must have some knowledge of the fraudulent act
or scheme he is aiding, though that knowledge may be actual or constructive, '"2"
but also noted that "a person may be held as an aider and abettor through either
an act or an omission."
26
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., the court sustained
a complaint holding that an insider may be held liable as an aider and abettor to
fraud for remaining silent because as an insider he owes a duty of "fair play" to
the public.2 The court recognized that not everyone who has knowledge of
improper activities in the securities field should be required to make disclosure,
but held that such a duty exists when the person is in special relationship and his
silence would give requisite assistance or encouragement to the perpetrator of a
fraud.28
21 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
22 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
24 324 F. Supp. at 195.
25 Id.
26 Id., citing Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966).
27 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 '(N.D. Ind. 1966).
28 Id. at 681-82; see also Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), where a charge against the American Stock Exchange of aiding and abetting the illegal
distribution of stock by failing to take disciplinary action against "abusive conduct and




The test enunciated in Brennan is vague. The court was careful to note that
whether silence or inaction constituted a violation under any particular cir-
cumstances was a question of fact.29 The test cannot be a "but for" test because
fraud could be stopped by anyone revealing it to the SEC. Emphasis, therefore,
must be placed on the "special relationship" of the person with knowledge of
fraud to determine whether a duty exists.
The management of NSMC was about to perpetrate a fraud by consummat-
ing a merger which was approved by the shareholders on the basis of misleading
financial statements. If the attorneys for NSMC had actual or constructive
knowledge of the impending fraud, they could be held liable as alders and
abettors under the rational in Brennan and National Bankers Life Insurance Co.
The shareholders were relying on the attorneys to protect the corporation against
violations of statutes or regulations. The fraud could not succeed unless the
attorneys remained silent. Under these circumstances it seems the attorney would
be in a "special relationship" and his silence would give "requisite assistance or
encouragement" to the perpetrators of the fraud.
In Fischer u. Kletz the court recognized "the potentially significant impact
upon accountants, lawyers and business entities in the event a precise rule or rules
of liability for nondisclosure are fashioned and recognized in the law."3 0 Never-
theless, it noted that "investors in publicly-held companies have a strong interest
in being afforded some degree of protection by and from those professional and
business persons whose representations axe relied upon for decisional purposes.""
Although these comments were made with reference to an accounting firm, the
language of the court could similarly be applied to attorneys.
IV. The Attorney-Client Privilege
A strong counterargument to this reasoning is that the attorney-client
privilege prevents an attorney from making disclosure although other persons in
a similar relationship would be required to do so. The attorney-client privilege is
intended to enable every person "to freely and fully confer and confide in one
having knowledge of the law ... free from the consequences of apprehension of
disclosure by reason of the subsequent statements of the skilled lawyer."32 The
privilege is not unqualified, however. Generally courts have held that it should
be strictly confined to its purpose. As one court has stated:
We recognize that the policy of full disclosure is a "more fundamental one"
than the policy of the attorney-client privilege; that the latter is not uni-
versally regarded as absolute and is to be strictly limited to the purpose for
which it exists. (Citation omitted.) 33
The court in Mauch v. Commissioner succinctly stated the policy behind the
privilege: "[I]t is a rule of balance. Some truth is suppressed so that the general
29 259 F. Supp. at 682.
30 266 F. Supp. 180, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (emphasis added).
31 Id.
32 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).
33 Id. at 631-32; cf. United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 976 (1964); Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.), 'ffd mem.,
339 U.S. 974 (1950); In re Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 401, 157 A.2d 695, 701 (1960).
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process of administering truth may be furthered."34 Since the rule is one of
balance, the courts have developed exceptions to it permitting disclosure where
the general purpose of allowing a client to freely confide in an attorney would not
be frustrated. The Courts have looked to the substance of the communications
between the attorney and client, and the relationship between the person desiring
disclosure and the person asserting the privilege to determine if particular com-
munications are privileged.
Communications between an attorney and a client regarding the future
commission of a crime or fraud are widely viewed as being outside the attorney-
client privilege. In re Sawyers Petition states the rule in the seventh circuit:
"[We think that the rule accepted by all courts today is that a client's com-
munication to his attorney in pursuit of a criminal or fraudulent act yet to be
performed is not privileged in any judicial proceeding." 5 In Hinds V. State Bar,
it was held that an attorney had an affirmative duty to make disclosure to the
court when he learned that his client intended to perpetrate a fraud by false state-
ments in his effort to secure a divorce. 6 In discovery proceedings it has generally
been held that a prima facie case of fraud must be raised by the opponent to
defeat the privilege.
3 7
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege does not impair
the accused's rights to counsel or his freedom to reveal all the facts of his case to
his attorney. It applies only to consultations concerning future or continuing
crimes or frauds and not to those committed in the past.3 s The courts in England
very early recognized that the crime-fraud exception might greatly diminish the
value of the attorney-client privilege, but held that the question of whether con-
sultation was for a legitimate purpose should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 9
In the securities law area the crime-fraud exception has been applied in
shareholder derivative actions so as to prevent a corporation from asserting the
attorney-client privilege against its shareholders. In Garner v. Wolfinbarger the
court upheld the stockholders' right, upon a showing of cause, to examine docu-
ments allegedly proving that the attorney advised management of his reservations
before the fraudulent sale of the corporation's stock :40
Two traditional exceptions are also persuasive in negativing any ab-
solute privilege in a corporation in the circumstances of this case. These are
the exceptions for communications in contemplation of a crime or fraud,
and for communications to a joint attorney.41
34 113 F.2d 555, 556 (3d Cir. 1940).
35 229 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); see, e.g., Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954). For a collection of cases, see Annot.,
125 A.L.R. 508 (1940).
36 19 Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941).
37 See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); United States v. Shewfelt, 455
F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972).
38 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
39 Regina v. Cox, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 153, 162-63; accord, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1 (1933).
40 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
41 Id. at 1102.
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In these circumstances, where the stockholders were seeking discovery, the court
liberally interpreted the crime-fraud exception, saying:
[W]e do not consider unavailability of the privilege to be confined to the
narrow ground of prospective criminal transactions. The differences between
prospective crime and prospective action of questionable legality or pro-
spective fraud, are differences of degree, not of principle. 42
In support of its view the court also noted that where shareholders seek disclosure
against their corporation another exception is applicable. The court referred to
several cases holding that when the same attorney acts for two or more parties
having a common interest, neither party may exercise the privilege in a sub-
sequent controversy with the other,4" and held that since the employment of an
attorney was for the benefit of all the stockholders, a group of stockholders, upon
a showing of cause, could penetrate the privilege when it was asserted against
them.44
In Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, a more liberal standard was applied which per-
mitted stockholders to penetrate the attorney-client privilege without a showing
of cause. 5 There it was held that "[a] corporate entity acts only for its stock-
holders, and they are entitled to see written communications and to inquire con-
cerning oral communications between their corporation and its attorneys."46
It was shown earlier that the attorney may have an affirmative duty to make
disclosure to prevent fraud. It was also shown that the courts have not allowed
corporations to assert the attorney-client privilege against shareholders seeking to
protect their interests, at least when they can show cause for disclosure. Therefore,
the attorney-client privilege should not abrogate the attorney's duty to make
disclosure when he is acting to protect the shareholder's interests from fraud by
management. Any necessary disclosure should be made to the SEC for two
reasons: (1) The SEC is the regulatory agency having supervisory power over
security transactions; and (2) the alternative would be disclosure to the individual
shareholders and this would not be practical in the case of a publicly held
corporation.
In NSMC the attorneys allegedly knew that the proxy solicitations were mis-
leading; yet they took no action to prevent the merger from being consummated.
Such inaction, if proven, would seem to establish a breach of duty owed to both
the corporation and the shareholders.
V. Ethical Considerations
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." However, the Dis-
ciplinary Rules provide that a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when
42 Id. at 1103.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1103-04.
45 50 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
46 Id. at 511.
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permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order."'47 The
Disciplinary Rules also contain a positive statement of the attorney's respon-
sibility. Rule 7-102 (A) (3) provides that in representing a client a lawyer shall
not "Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal." Thus, if the attorney has a duty to make disclosure which is not
abrogated by the attorney-client privilege, he not only is permitted by the Code
of Professional Responsibility to make disclosure but he is ethically required to
do so.
The problem of fraud is specifically treated by the code. The Disciplinary
Rules forbid the attorney to "Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."4 They also provide that:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal.49
Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility would seem to impose a duty upon
an attorney to make disclosure to the commission or the shareholders if he learns
of a client's fraud.
VI. The Duty to Investigate
The attorney's investigatory responsibilities differ from those of the inde-
pendent accountant. This is important because a question may arise as to whether
the attorney should be held responsible for failure to prevent a fraudulent act if
he knew of no impending violations of statutes, regulations or conditions but
could have discovered such discrepancies if he had made an investigation.
In situations such as NSMC, the attorneys' and accountants' investigatory
responsibilities are basically contractual. The independent accountant's opinion
will state that he has examined the company's financial statements ".... in ac-
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included
such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances."5 In general, the attorney's opinion
will state that no violations of federal or state statutes or regulations have oc-
curred to the knowledge of counsel. The attorney does not undertake an investi-
gation; he only undertakes to render an opinion on the facts which have come to
his attention. In this regard his role is similar to that of the dependent ac-
countant.51 But an attorney cannot ignore facts which have come to his attention.
As one court stated: "[A] lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for
fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand." 2
47 ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 4, DR 4-101(C) (2)'(1970).
48 Id. Canon 7, DR 7-102 (A) (7).
49 Id. DR 7-102(B).
50 STATEMENT No. 50(3) (1971).
51 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
52 SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968). These remarks on the duties of in-
vestigation apply only to attorney's opinions rendered "to the knowledge of counsel." Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), may require an investigation to be
made before an attorney signs a registration statement.
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Earlier it was shown that an attorney may be liable for fraud even if he only has
"constructive knowledge" of the violation.53 Thus, though the attorney has not
undertaken an investigation by contract, he may be required to draw inferences
from facts within his knowledge and perform a limited investigation to resolve
doubts about the legality of a transaction which arise during his employment. If
an attorney did not perform this limited investigation, a court might consider it a
lack of professional care.
VII. Conclusion
An attorney for a corporation owes his loyalty to the entity and not neces-
sarily to management. When the attorney learns that management is about to
perpetrate a fraud, he must make efforts to dissuade management from pursuing
this course. Failing that, he has a duty to reveal the facts to the SEC to prevent
fraud from occurring. The attorney-client privilege does not bar such disclosure
since the crime-fraud exception would be applicable as well as the exception
which would allow stockholders to penetrate the privilege, upon a showing of
cause, when they believed that management is acting adversely to their interests.
While these disclosure responsibilities have not been judicially recognized in the
field of securities law NSMC offers an opportunity for such recognition in the
future. The attorney may be required to conduct a limited investigation before
rendering an opinion "to the knowledge of counsel" when he learns of facts which
would cause a competent professional to suspect violations. The attorney should
not be required to examine financial statements when he is acting solely as
attorney for the corporation because he has not undertaken to do so.
The controversy over NSMC has been widely publicized. Clients have
exhibited a lack of understanding of its implications causing great concern to
attorneys and clients alike. As a result, some clients may in the future hesitate
to make full disclosure to counsel. Attorneys should take the initiative to reassure
clients that even if disclosure of impending fraudulent activities is required, that
does not mean damaging facts learned while defending a client must be disclosed.
This advice would accomplish two purposes. First, it would help convince clients
that they need not fear disclosing information to their attorney; second, it would
discourage attempted securities violations since it would be difficult to perpetrate
a fraud without the attorney's being apprised of the illegal activity.
The concept of the attorney being required to disclose certain facts is not
new to the law. It has, however, never been extended to the securities field,
although it should have been. If these disclosure responsibilities are recognized,
the attorney will no longer be able to hide behind the attorney-client privilege
when rendering an opinion; but that is not the purpose of the privilege anyway.
John F. Gaither, Jr.
53 SEC v. Natl Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 448
F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971) ; see text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
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